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The African telecommunications union: A Pan-African approach to telecommunications reform
PATRICIA K. McCORMICK, Department of Radio, TV and Film, The John H. Johnson School of Communications, Howard University, 525 Bryant Street, NW, Washington, DC 20059, USA

Abstract
This article examines the organisational structure and strategic plans of the African Telecommunications Union (ATU). Although the ATU has been restructured to include private telecommunications entities as associate members, it remains essentially an inter-governmental agency. The article assesses the benefits of a regional
approach to telecommunications reform and proposes that regional economic organisations replace the nation states
as members of the ATU. Although the goals of the ATU, as articulated in its strategic plans are laudable, clearly defined benchmarks and specific strategies to achieve them are needed to make the organisation more effective.
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INTRODUCTION
If the wealth and socio-economic health of a region is defined by its ability to participate in the
networked economy, Africa is indeed impoverished. In an era of accelerated technological
change, Africa's technological dependency and
underdevelopment utterly impairs its ability to
compete in the global economy. This is evidenced by it comprising less than one percent of
global trade (Oshikoya & Hussain, 1999). The
African continent grows increasingly marginalized as technological advancements in other areas of the world are accompanied by new patterns
of dependency in Africa. This situation is further
aggravated by the policies of the predatory, neocolonial state (Castells, 2000). The capitalintensive nature of the sector, coupled with Africa's rent position in terms of technology and its
consequent inability to control costs, also places
unattainable demands on the continent. Africa is
the most indebted region in the world in per capita terms with nearly half of its population subsisting on less than one US dollar per day (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 2001a).
As the only region of the world where poverty
levels are projected to increase, Africa can illafford to invest in the expansion of telecommunication services. Although the number of telephone lines has increased in absolute terms on
2!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2005!

the continent, the growth rate needs to be much
greater to have a positive impact and outpace
population growth, which at around three percent
is the highest in the world (Oshikoya & Hussain,
1999).
To remedy this situation, the African Telecommunications Union (ATU) has articulated its
mission to effectively promote the rapid development of information communications technologies in Africa in order to achieve universal access and full inter-country connectivity (African
Telecommunications Union (ATU), 1999). The
ATU is not only cognizant of the vital role the
telecommunications sector plays in promoting
socio-economic development, but it also recognizes the need to develop telecommunications
networks and services in a concerted, planned
and integrated manner (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 1999). The potential for cooperation between states is arguably highest
when the issue at stake reinforces an interdependent relationship among the states involved,
so collaboration on an issue-specific area, such
as telecommunications, may offer better potential
for success than macro-level schemes (Akinyemi,
2001). This article thus examines the organisational structure and strategic plans of the ATU,
as well as the challenges it faces in achieving its
goals and objectives to facilitate telecommunications policy reform and related infrastructure and
service developments in its member states. This
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article assesses the efforts of the ATU for it is
important that this continental organisation, in its
various endeavours, actually achieves tangible
results and is not merely a Pan-African paper
tiger.
METHODOLOGY
Since the research is interdisciplinary in nature with several contemporary, interrelated issues being examined, this work employs the case
study, which draws upon multiple data sources to
develop converging lines of inquiry or triangulation to investigate a specific phenomenon. A major strength of case study data collection is its use
of several different sources of evidence. This
study, based on field work conducted in Kenya in
the summer of 2002, draws on three primary
sources of evidence: documentation, archival
records, and elite interviews. Documentation
sources include, among other references, policy
and legal documents from the ATU. In the process of gathering data, interviews were conducted with officials of the ATU, including the secretary general, as well as others intimately involved in the telecommunications sector. These
interviews, while open-ended in nature, followed
a specific set of questions concerning telecommunications policy and infrastructure developments in Africa.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AN OVERVIEW

IN

AFRICA:

Africa, with a population of some 840 million, is
one of the least networked or computerized regions in the world. The continent claims 12 percent of the world's population, but only 2 percent
of the world's telephones, which are unevenly
distributed both within and between countries.
Eighty percent of the lines are concentrated in
just eight countries, and in some states teledensity rates are as low as one telephone line per
1000 people (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 2001a, p. 2). Paradoxically, although
Africa encompasses thirty-four of the world's
least developed countries, it boasts some of the
highest costs for international calls and the laying
3!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2005!

of fixed telephone lines. It is estimated that the
average cost per line in the region is over
US$4500, which is more than three times the industry average of US$1500 (Oshikoya &
Hussain, 1999), and results in prohibitive subscription costs. Such institutional inefficiency
coupled with inadequate human resources and
maintenance problems that derive from an absence of common operating standards, proper
maintenance procedures, and standardized
equipment, together account in part for the demise of fixed line telephony in Africa.
This situation demands that African states restructure and reform the telecommunications sector and invest in mobile services in order to promote network efficiencies and extend the infrastructure to the rural populace. Despite comprising the majority of Africans, the rural population
has yet to benefit from the deployment of new
communication technologies, since investment in
the more profitable urban and international markets has been at the expense of providing access
to rural and low-income users. Developments in
the telecommunications sector, including the rapid growth of pre-paid cellular phone services,
have remained an urban phenomenon as service
providers argue that it is not economically feasible to roll out a network to cover an entire country. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) (2004) estimates that less than half the
population in Sub-Saharan Africa was covered
by a mobile signal in 2003. Although Africa's
mobile market has been the fastest growing of
any region over the past 5 years, raising its mobile penetration to 6.2 per 100 inhabitants at the
end of 2003, twice the fixed rate, this still represents the lowest mobile penetration of any region
(International Telecommunications Union (ITU),
2004). Furthermore, the fact that rural and urban
telephony statistics are not disaggregated from
national statistics reflects and fosters the lack of
priority accorded the development of this sector
in rural areas, as figures of urban growth conceal
the often stagnant picture of rural telecommunications development (Shanmugavelan &
Warnock, 2004). Universal access policies and
mechanisms, which ensure that profits from the
lucrative sectors are used to provide service in
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rural and economically deprived areas, have not
been instituted. Rural coverage requirements
must be a stated requirement of license obligations and must be enforced, since African states
are likely to expand the telecommunications sector through a wireless platform.
It is important to note, though, that while
mobile services carry relatively lower fixed network costs than wire line networks, especially in
areas of low population density, the cost of mobile-based equipment and calls generally continue to be higher than fixed-line systems, so mobile services may still be beyond the economic
reach of rural people. To facilitate mobile access,
a single cell phone and thus its associated costs is
often shared among family members or friends.
Also employed to reduce costs are beep-calls,
that is when one places a call to a mobile phone
owner and then ends the call before it incurs
charges as a way to request the mobile phone
owner to return a call or as a pre-arranged message (“I’ll beep when I’m leaving”) (Chango,
2004). To address this and other cost-saving
practices, some companies are now providing a
free ‘Call Me’ text message together with the
owner's phone number as well as removing the
time constraint to buy air-time or recharge credit
on prepaid packages (Chango, 2004). It remains
vitally important to employ competition and regulation to secure the economic viability of mobile services as an option to increase the telephone penetration or tele-density rate in rural areas, since, according to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) (2004, p. 24), the
average African expenditure of US$27 per month
for mobile services is more than half the official
average African per capita income, testimony to
the existing urban clientele.
Mobile service providers have also yet to invest heavily in mobile data services built over the
existing GSM platform, which enables slow and
medium-speed Internet access (Commonwealth
Telecommunications Organisation, 2002). There
are various advanced technologies emerging that
offer higher-speed access to portable Internet users, but mobile operators in Africa have largely
confined themselves to the voice market because
they are uncertain of the financial viability of
4!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2005!

mobile data, since much of the information on
the Internet is irrelevant to the needs of the people in rural African communities and the commercial character of the Internet embodies a culture that, too, is not germane to the African environment. High levels of Short Message Service
(SMS) usage in Africa have been adversely affected by the prevalence of pre-paid users; however, as the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) (2004) notes, if African users are
choosing the pre-paid option because it is less
expensive than subscription, they may choose to
send SMS if they are cheaper than voice calls.
Although these services are just emerging in Africa, they may fare well in the future since such a
notable market gap exists in service offerings.
In this context, though, one should note that
African states are exceedingly dependent on satellites with more than 95 percent of international
traffic carried by satellite in the majority of countries, yet it is increasingly difficult for them to
lease capacity on the satellites above Africa for
they are heavily subscribed (Commonwealth
Telecommunications Organisation, 2002). As the
Regional African Satellite Communications Organisation (RASCOM) prepares to launch a satellite to meet some of the needs of the continent,
it is faced with the challenge of securing an allocation of orbital space, for ironically, “there are
an estimated 300 satellites across the equator that
cuts through Africa yet none of them serves the
continent” (African Telecommunications Union
(ATU), 2001a).
The ATU realizes that to achieve sustainable
development and create effective regional economies as well as ensure the fundamental right to
communicate, it is imperative that Africans, who
do not live in the capital cities, but in rural communities, are provided with telecommunication
services; otherwise the existing inequities in the
distribution of power and wealth become increasingly entrenched. The ATU recognizes the preponderance of the problems and seeks to redress
the rural–urban divide in both Internet and telephony access through forging public–private
partnerships in an effort to develop the telecommunications or information communications sector.
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THE CREATION AND STRUCTURE OF
THE ATU
The ATU is a specialized agency or organ of the
recently created African Union (AU), which was
officially formed in July 2001 to replace the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The ATU is
based in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, but due to the war there
has been temporarily moved to Nairobi, Kenya.
The ATU was established with 26 member states
as signatories in December 1999 as the successor
to the Pan-African Telecommunications Union
(PATU). To ensure that the ATU is more than a
mere change of names, it employs the instruments of its constitution, convention, and administrative regulations (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 1999). The ATU was also
structurally altered to include a General Secretariat, comprising a secretary general who serves as
the chief executive officer, and a management
team, composed of the directors of the development and technical sectors. The most notable
change, though, is the creation of a new class of
membership—the associate member—in an effort to bridge the differences between the public
and private sectors in both policies and operations (Gideon, 2000).
In the process of promoting the accessibility
and use of information technologies, the ATU
also recognizes the need for African states to
create strong, though lean, independent regulators. Because many African states have a weak
regulatory mechanism and no clear policy or legislation regarding the telecommunications sector,
the ATU assists in policy formulation and advises and oversees the financial and technical regulatory plans of its member states. Many governments, in their haste to promulgate telecommunications laws in response to, principally, external
pressure, have failed to establish an institutional
mechanism to continuously review sector policy
(Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisation, 2002). This situation can be remedied as the
ATU seeks to design policies and legislation that
create a more liberal and competitive telecommunications sector that accommodates, if not
mandates, a greater role for the private and non5!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2005!

profit sectors and private–public partnerships.
The ATU supports the creation of well-structured
public–private partnerships in its member states,
because it is thought that such partnerships can
provide the resources to build a regional telecommunications infrastructure. In its effort to
construct public–private partnerships, membership in the ATU includes government and independent telecommunication regulators as well as
public and private service providers.
Associate Members
Any private entity involved in the information
communications sector, which is registered in a
country that is a member of the ATU, may apply
for associate membership. Entities that are registered in an African country that is not a member
of the ATU, which is, generally speaking, a
country that is not a member of the AU, are still
eligible for membership. The ATU thus has the
potential to comprise hundreds of associate
members, for such membership embraces a variety of categories, including operators, service
providers, ICT vendors, and industrial, scientific,
and educational organizations. Operators may be
fixed network operators or mobile network operators, cable operators or satellite operators. Service providers may be Internet service providers,
application service providers, television broadcasters or radio broadcasters. ICT vendors include companies that may provide, among other
services, operational support systems, billing system software, and fixed or mobile network technology. A diverse range of organisations may
also apply for associate membership, including
consulting agencies, publishers or news media,
universities, investment banks, and regional telecommunication organisations, such as the Telecommunications Regulators Association of
Southern Africa (African Telecommunications
Union (ATU), 2001b).
Through participation in various activities
undertaken by the ATU, such as conferences,
seminars, workshops, and colloquia, associate
members may contribute to the development of
policy, regulation, network standards and interconnection rates. Associate members may nomi-
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nate and be nominated as chairpersons of the
Technical and Development Conference, but
may only attend the Conference of Plenipotentiaries and Council of the Union as observers
without voting privileges (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 2001b).
Organisational structure of the ATU
The ATU is composed of five principal constituents: the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, the
Administrative Council, the Technical and Development Conference, the General Secretariat,
and Non-Permanent Units. The Conference of
Plenipotentiaries (CPL), the supreme policy organ of the ATU, is attended by Ministers of
Communications who meet every 4 years to approve strategic plans and budgets on a 4-year cycle. The CPL also holds authority to revise, as
necessary, the ATU constitution and convention,
and elect both the secretary general and members
of the Administrative Council. The Administrative Council, which meets on an annual basis, is
responsible for the implementation of the strategic plans and approves the annual work programmes and budgets and also generates all
memoranda of understanding with regional and
global partners (African Telecommunications
Union (ATU), 2001b). The ATU has signed cooperation agreements with, for example, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the
Regional African Satellite Communications Organisation, and selected regional economic organisations such as the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa. The Technical and
Development Conference sets standards and
guidelines and essentially serves as the forum for
exchange between public and private sector
stakeholders on a variety of policy, regulatory,
technical and financial issues.
ATU Budget
Annual contributions from the member states and
the associate members, the amount of which is
based on the budget adopted by the Council and
according to a scale adopted by the CPL, constitute the primary financial basis of the ATU. Contributions for associate members are assessed on
6!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2005!

the scale of contribution of the member state in
which it is registered. There are three contribution levels for associate members: corporate-gold
is equivalent to one-quarter of the member state's
contribution; corporate-silver is equal to oneeighth and corporate-bronze one-sixteenth of the
member state's contribution (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 2001b). These are
minimum contribution levels, determined in part
on the size of the company or firm in question,
and all members are, of course, encouraged to
contribute additional assets to further strengthen
the financial base of the ATU (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 2000). Other financial resources include extra-budgetary contributions and donations approved by the Council,
voluntary donations, sundry income from services rendered, and income generated by the
Business Unit (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 1999). When arrears of contributions
are paid in excess of the debts that the ATU owes
to staff and third parties, the surplus funds will
be employed to finance work programme activities (African Telecommunications Union (ATU),
2001b).
One of the primary factors that constrained
the PATU's ability to succeed was inadequate
financial support from many of its members. The
ATU, too, is hampered in its endeavours due to
membership arrears. In April 2001, the General
Secretariat presented to the Council budgetary
estimates for the financial year 2001–2002 in the
amount of US$833,635, holding to the ceiling of
the previous year (African Telecommunications
Union (ATU), 2001c). The limited number of
ATU staff and the trend of low membership contribution necessitated this prudent approach to
financial management. Although the Council approved the budget, it also recommended that the
secretary general appeal to those member states
that owe the ATU a considerable amount of arrears of contribution. While external donors
could assist in nurturing the development of the
ATU, such support could not be provided indefinitely and dependence on foreign aid, which
Nkrumah (1963) describes as one of the more
subtle forms of neo-colonialism, is best avoided.
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Thus it is imperative that African states be financially forthcoming.
STRUCTURAL WEAKNESS OF THE ATU
Although membership fees are small in comparison to what most states spend on their own security or military apparatus, financial constraints
seriously hamper the efforts of the ATU because
governments fail to pay the arrears on their dues.
Since key administrative appointments are often
highly politicised, governments are generally
more willing to pay their fees to regional or continental associations when the secretary general
and other top staff are from their state or the institution is headquartered in their country (Daddieh, 1995). Unfortunately, the ATU is financially dependent on governments for it remains essentially an inter-governmental organisation. As
of August 2002 the ATU consisted of merely 10
associate members.1 The ATU needs to provide
clear incentives for its existing members to pay
their fees as well as conduct extensive outreach
to build a base of private participants or its demise is certain.
Like other Pan-African approaches, the fundamental issue that must be addressed concerns
representation. Having nation-states as members
of the ATU with full voting privileges constitutes
a top–down approach to telecommunications development. Although the World Telecommunications Advisory Council recommends that the telecommunications sector be raised to the highest
political level, the general public too needs to be
informed of the issues and the ramifications of
decisions to stimulate policy discussion and
make politicians more responsive to their needs
(Jensen, 1995). The ATU cannot claim to represent users for they have no voice and no vote in
non-democratic and politically unstable states,
which continue to dominate Africa. Thus, despite
the ATU's attempts to create a transparent, participatory structure that is accountable to its
members, it is difficult to see how the ATU can
be an enduring democratic institution if its constituent member countries lack good governance
and strong constitutional rights for its citizenry.
7!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2005!

As Mbaku (1999) writes, each new set of political elites, whether they are civilian or military,
suspend or discard existing constitutions and
draft new ones to legitimise their rule. These
same African rulers zealously defend their sovereignty and lack the political will and commitment to subordinate domestic political and economic interests to supranational institutions with
long-term regional integration goals (IbeikeJonah, 2001). They often fail to support regionalism and South–South cooperation because they
are politically and economically aligned with
leaders of the G-8 as they seek to reap the riches
of their countries and their international linkages
for personal profit (Brown, 1996). Daddieh
(1995) suggests that the absence of sound political leadership, coupled with the failure to organize, nurture and involve the civil society in the
articulation and implementation of regional policies, has resulted in ineffectual integration efforts.
To integrate, African states must essentially be
deconstructed and the state apparatus reconstructed to increase popular participation and reduce political opportunism. According to Davidson (1994), what is needed is a decolonisation
of institutions.
THE POST-COLONIAL AFRICAN STATE
The colonial state, in its design as an authoritarian, exploitative, and repressive structure, failed
to address issues of public accountability, political representation, and constitutionally guaranteed civil rights and civil liberties, which meant
that these attributes of government were not
transferred to the local political elites. The postcolonial state is thus not generally representative
of the majority of its citizens. The colonial state
with its absence of democratic principals and
customs became the superstructure upon which
African political elites constructed a mercenary
or predatory state, characterised by economic
mismanagement, social injustice, political instability, and corruption coupled with personal and
ethnic loyalties. This situation grew further entrenched by African countries’ colonial inheritance of the centrist function of the state in the
development of the economy (Iheduru, 2001).
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Upon independence many African governments undertook large-scale development projects, including management of the telephone
companies, for which local entrepreneurs, like
the governments, had insufficient expertise and
resources. Governments financed and managed
these projects by borrowing heavily from the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
According to Iheduru (2001), not only were the
governments incapable of successfully embarking upon such a wide range of activities, the
large capital transfers enabled the local political
elites to pillage the state treasury while providing
a façade of national development. The resultant
economic mismanagement and waste, and the
consequential financial and political crisis, which
spanned the continent by the late 1970s, engendered the restructuring of the national economies
(Iheduru, 2001).
By the mid-1980s most African states were
engaged in externally designed structural adjustment programmes because the Bretton Woods
institutions and other bilateral development aid
agencies required economic restructuring as a
lending conditionality. By emphasising the market allocation of resources, the role of the state
was to be reduced. The argument advanced was
that economic structural adjustment, despite its
short-term negative social consequences, would
generate the impetus, internally and externally, to
deconstruct the post-colonial state and its reconfiguration would serve as an initial step toward
eventual economic growth in the country
(Iheduru, 2001). This approach has proven largely unsuccessful, principally because in the process of adjustment governments are to adopt policies that may be economically rational, but are
irrefutably politically irrational as the state is to
dismantle its own power through employing institutional and public sector reforms, which may
entail divestment, curtailed subsidies for stateowned enterprises, reduced protectionism and
trade liberalization. This orthodox paradox also
presents a quandary for integrative organizations,
as they too require states to curtail their power in
favour of a regional institution.
THEORIES OF INTEGRATION
8!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2005!

There are basically two contrasting approaches to
integration, the functionalist and the neofunctionalist. Theorists of both views contend
that states, which share interests, values, objectives, and experiences, need to concede their
sovereignty to realize mutual goals. The functionalist approach views integration as an evolutionary process, in which states initially cooperate on specific, apolitical projects and in so doing
learn to trust one another to the point where a
political union can evolve. The neo-functionalists
are principally concerned with the rate of integration and the creation of structural mechanisms to
resolve inevitable disputes and divergence of
views. The neo-functionalists contend that the
slow pace of the evolutionary approach allows
for more time for differences to develop and fester, which would create an impasse in the process
toward integration, notably because the functionalists lack the mechanisms to address the numerous complications inherent in moving from nonpolitical areas of cooperation to political union.
The neo-functionalists thus favour the creation of
institutional instruments to respond to political
and other differences as they arise and to penalize errant members (Akpuru-Aja, 2001).
THE OAU/AU
Since the formation of the OAU in 1963, numerous inter-governmental institutions aimed at integration have been formed, but they are each
only as strong as their member states empower
them to be. As African leaders jealously guard
their state sovereignty, they fail to charge the integrative organizations with the powers, legal
and resource-wise, to enforce regional policies at
the national level. This serious problem is rooted
in the structure of the OAU, which missed an
important, initial opportunity to form a political
federation of African states. The Charter of the
OAU was itself contradictory or hypocritical in
that its signatories pledged to defend the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of
Africa's states while simultaneously getting rid of
all forms of colonialism in Africa, though the
artifice of the nation-state was its most insidious
relic. Although the charter of the AU, which was
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officially formed in July of 2001 to replace the
OAU, maintains the colonially defined nationstates, it differs from its predecessor in that it includes “respect for democratic principles, human
rights, the rule of law and good governance,” but
the transference of these words into practice is
what is at issue (Ibeike-Jonah, 2001). Simply
signing an agreement achieves naught, as a review of treaties, conference resolutions and protocols agreed to by African states reveals that
they have rarely been translated into actions and
commitments (Akpuru-Aja, 2001). It is imperative, though, given that the telecommunications
network is a fundamental infrastructure with a
pervasive effect on the performance and development of an economy, that the ATU not befall
the same fate as other regional initiatives and become another ineffectual Pan-African organization.
CHANGING THE ROLE OF REGIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONS
For the ATU to be an effective, integrative association, a high degree of uniformity in telecommunications policy among African regional organizations as well as individual member states
is of critical importance. There are several major
regional economic associations in Africa, including the Economic Community of West Africa
(ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS),
the Southern African Development Community
(SADC), the East African Community (EAC),
the Community of Sahel and Saharan States
(CED-SAD), and the West African Economic
Community (CEAO), which comprises francophone countries. In an attempt to ensure a uniformed approach to telecommunications development, regional economic organisations and
their corresponding telecommunications units
should be considered, not as associate members,
but as members of the ATU with all the privileges thereof and thereby replace the individual nation-states as representatives. This structural alteration would represent a revolutionary ap9!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2005!

proach to a continental organisation and advance
the efforts of the AU toward integration.
The existing configuration of these regional
economic organisations, however, requires restructuring, because they do not conform to the
AU's division of the continent and there is overlap among the members. Several states in Southern Africa, for example, are members of both
COMESA and SADC. The economic costs of
participation in two regional organisations and
the potential for incongruent policies must be
avoided. The AU has divided the continent into
five sub-regions: (1) North Africa, comprising
six states, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania,
Morocco, and Tunisia; (2) West Africa, comprising 14 states, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia,
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and
Togo; (3) Central Africa, comprising 10 states,
Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao
Tome and Principe; (4) East Africa, comprising
10 states, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Madagascar, Mauritius, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, and (5) Southern Africa, comprised of six states, Lesotho, Malawi, Republic
of South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (African Telecommunications Union (ATU),
2002). Five major regional economic organisations, based on the AU's design, could thus replace the existing associations and avoid duplicate membership.
In order for this strategy to succeed, though,
the potential for incongruent policies between
these groupings must be addressed and the problem of political leadership, as noted earlier, must
be remedied through good governance and strong
constitutional rights. Also, regional integration
organisations and stratagems must be incorporated into the educational system or curriculum,
beginning at the elementary school level. The
media, too, must focus greater attention on integration efforts to ensure that the people understand what such schemes are intended to achieve.
An educated public must then be organized into
private regional advocacy associations to ensure
that regional commitments and goals are not
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subordinated to national ones (Daddieh, 1995).
Such strategies to promote regional integration
have not, however, been enlisted to date
(Ihonvbere, 1999). Leaders must come to realize,
though, that African states will be further marginalized if they do not pursue collective selfreliance and political and economic regional integration, the long-term benefits of which will
surpass any immediate costs.
REGIONAL EFFORTS AND INTEGRATION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Success in macro-level regional schemes have
been elusive, largely because of the lack of confidence and trust at the interstate level, which
reflects internal dilemmas within African states
as the citizens distrust their national governments
(Akpuru-Aja, 2001). Since cooperation on issuespecific areas, such as telecommunications, may
offer better potential for success, these microlevel measures can assist in constructing confidence in regional organisations. In turn, they can
become the building blocks for achieving macrolevel regional integration, which is necessary to
promote socio-economic development goals and
overcome the balkanisation of the continent during the colonial era. The small size of the telecommunications market caused by low levels of
economic development, coupled with perceived
high investment risks and uncertain regulatory
environments, necessitates that actions in regard
to this sector be pursued within the framework of
comprehensive sub-regional plans. An individual
country's attempts at improving the telecommunications sector will be futile if neighbouring
states are not exerting similar efforts (Matsebula
& Simelane, 1996).
African regional organisations, in recognising
the important role telecommunications plays in
development, need to require member states to
lower, if not eliminate, import tariffs on information technology hardware such as computer
equipment and printers. Communications equipment is often treated as a luxury item and thus
heavily taxed, because many African states use
these tariffs as a source of revenue (Oshikoya &
Hussain, 1999). Telecommunications initiatives
10!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2005!

will only succeed if African governments realize
that lowering import tariffs will actually serve as
a greater stimulus for development than as a
means of revenue generation (Jensen, 1995).
In addition to tariff reductions, equipment
and services need to be coordinated as regional
or group purchases, because costs can be substantially cut through bulk purchasing. Indeed, as
Jensen (1995)notes, if a sufficient number of
countries can agree on a joint procurement policy,
not only can greater volume discounts be negotiated with suppliers, the operators can benefit
from sharing the skills developed in operating the
same equipment. Shared technical standards, too,
can be developed which will further facilitate
regional integration. Jensen (1995) suggests that
it may even be beneficial to establish regional
telecommunications operators, which could
achieve sufficient economies of scale to support
research and development investments and provide one-stop, uniform availability of international and national network services. To date,
however, neither the ATU nor any of the regional
economic organizations are engaged in regional
procurement of equipment or the creation of regional operators, though some have created regional regulatory associations.
Regional regulatory associations
The SADC provides a model for the establishment of a regional regulatory organization. In an
effort to bridge the gap between the formulation
of regional legislation and policies and effective
execution at the national level, SADC created the
Telecommunications Regulators Association of
Southern Africa (TRASA), the Constitution of
which became effective on 22 April 1998. Relevant SADC structures also endorsed regional telecommunications policies and a Model Telecommunications Bill as a guideline in formulating national legislation (SADCC-TU, 1999). The
restructuring of the incumbent national operator,
specifically the termination of its ability to prescribe the tariffs at which it provides telecommunications services and its powers to make bylaws and regulation, as well as the establishment
of an independent regulatory authority and its
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duties and powers are the twin foci of the Bill.
As the formerly self-regulating fixed line monopoly service providers lose their regulatory
powers with the creation of independent regulatory agencies, the creation of TRASA was considered essential to facilitate regional telecommunications reform and enhance service provision.
Membership in TRASA is moreover contingent upon a country's law providing for the establishment of an autonomous regulatory authority. Countries, which do not possess independent
regulators, can participate in the activities of
TRASA, but do not have voting rights (Southern
Africa Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) (1999a) and Southern Africa
Transport and Communications Commission
Technical Unit (SATCC) (1999b)). Members
share the cost of operating TRASA equally (Telecommunications Regulators Association of
Southern Africa (TRASA), 1997). According to
Article 3 of the TRASA Constitution, the objectives of the organization are to “co-ordinate regulatory matters and ... promote the establishment
and operation of efficient, adequate, and costeffective telecommunications networks and services in the Southern Africa region which meet
the diverse needs of customers while being economically sustainable” (Telecommunications
Regulators Association of Southern Africa
(TRASA), 1997).
These goals, to varying degrees, are also
shared by other regional regulatory associations,
including the West Africa Telecommunication
Regulators Association (WATRA), which was
formally inaugurated in May 2002 and has since
established its secretariat at the Economic Community of West African States secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria and the Association of Regulation of
Information and Communications of Eastern and
Southern Africa (ARICEA), which was launched
in January 2003 as the regulatory association for
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa. COMESA also seeks to facilitate increased trade relations among its member states
by supporting the creation of a regional telecommunications network that is to be built and
managed by the private company COMTEL
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Communications Ltd (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 2003). Both ARICEA and
WATRA encourage the separation of the roles of
policy-maker, regulator, and service provider,
but membership in these organizations, unlike
TRASA, is not subject to the creation of an independent regulator. Rather Article 3 of the
WATRA Constitution states as one of its objectives, “the establishment of distinct, independent
and adequately empowered national telecommunications regulatory agencies in countries in the
sub-regional where such agencies have not been
created” (West Africa Telecommunications Regulators’ Association (WATRA), 2002, p. 5).
Membership in WATRA and ARICEA is thus
open to the regulators of all countries in the respective sub-regions, be they independent institutions or integrated with the state-owned service
provider, provided that one regulator represents
each country. Not only do both of these regional
regulatory associations lack criteria for membership, they, like TRASA, also lack any power of
enforcement.
In pursuance of its objectives, Article 3.2(a)
of the WATRA Constitution and Article 3.2(b)
of the ARICEA Constitution state that the regulatory association may “deliberate on issues” relating to telecommunications regulation and the development and application of information and
communication technologies and “make recommendations” to the respective governments of
member states or other relevant or appropriate
authorities (Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA), 2003; West Africa
Telecommunications Regulators’ Association
(WATRA), 2002). The Constitutions fail, however, to render member states accountable for
adopting these recommendations. Although Article 16 of the ARICEA Constitution and Article
10.7 of the WATRA Constitution state that sanctions may be imposed against any member that is
in arrears of its annual dues for more than 1 year
for reasons other than exceptional circumstances,
this is an insufficient disciplinary measure, which
is only employed in cases of financial default. No
mechanisms have been instituted to penalise a
state for its failure to adopt recommendations,
which further policy harmonization in regard to
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the restructuring of the telecommunications sector. These regional regulatory associations are
thus essentially impotent, as they have yet to be
entrusted with the means of enforcement.
Although a deficient telecommunications
system can be considered the foremost non-tariff
barrier to intra- and extra-African trade, the
World Bank contends that large infrastructure
investments will not stimulate regional integration unless various other regulatory, procedural
and administrative obstacles that obstruct trade
are first removed (Daddieh, 1995). Structural adjustment programmes, intended to remove these
barriers, have, however, yet to be designed to
incorporate regional reform strategies and explore ways in which responsibility for regional
disbursement of loans can be shared (Daddieh,
1995). Adjustment programmes themselves have
served to reinforce the arbitrary, colonially defined nation-states, without recognising or supporting regional integration structures. The
World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund continue to treat individual African states
in isolation and have not begun to strengthen regional cooperation efforts (Brown, 1996). Nonetheless, for African states to coordinate and
streamline their economies, undertake adjustment
as a single unit, and directly confront the problem of persistent structural economic dependence,
economic decisions taken nationally will have to
take into account regional positions and circumstances. African leaders need to accept that some
decisions, previously made at the individual national level, will be taken collectively through
regional institutions and will be binding on all. If
the international financial institutions possessed
this understanding, the East African Community
(EAC) Digital Transmission Project would not
have been aborted.
EAC-digital transmission project
To create a single market and investment area,
the East African Community, comprising of
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, sought to interconnect the three countries with international
submarine cable networks. The proposed US$60
M project, overseen by a steering committee
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composed of the CEOs of the three telephone
companies, Telkom Kenya, Tanzania Telkom,
and Uganda Telkom, aimed at introducing state
of the art technology to accommodate the growing demand for telecommunications services in
the region (African Telecommunications Union
(ATU), 2000). According to Mureithi (1999), the
European Investment Bank (EIB) committed to
extend loan facilities for 50 percent of the total
project costs and intended to cover all foreign
exchange component costs. The loan package
was part of risk capital to be taken over directly
by the project overseers, that is, the telephone
companies of each country, without the respective governments’ guarantees. To further assure
success of the project, the companies urged the
three governments to extend support by waiving
duties and taxes, which both Uganda and Kenya
agreed to do. The East African Development
Bank was also to provide a loan. The World
Bank, however, effectively blocked the EACDigital Transmission Project by not allowing
Tanzania to commit to additional loans in the
telecommunications sector beyond US$2 M. The
Bank held Tanzania to the terms of the US$250
M Telecommunications Restructuring Programme, which it signed in 1993 (Mureithi,
1999). This stance on behalf of the World Bank
in refusing to refuse to consent to Tanzania's request to secure additional funds for the telecommunications sector not only demonstrates the rigidity and inflexibility of the World Bank, but
also its utter disregard for viable indigenous projects to facilitate regional integration.
Regional monetary and financial institutions
must be strengthened, as Amin (1997) suggests,
so that they may serve as substitutes for the IMF
and World Bank for securing capital. Such initiatives are difficult to launch, though, as Japan can
testify, for in 1997 it offered $100 billion to help
create an Asian Monetary Fund in order to finance the required action to alleviate the financial crisis afflicting East Asia, but was thwarted
in its efforts by both the IMF and the US Treasury (Stiglitz, 2002). As the only shareholder with
veto power in the IMF, the US maintains considerable leverage over IMF policies. It would be
unlikely to retain such a position in an Asian
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Monetary Fund in which Japan, and possibly
China, would be the likely major contributors
and hence whose voices would predominate
(Stiglitz, 2002). The countries of East Asia did,
however, later quietly create a more modest version of the proposed Asian Monetary Fund under
the innocuous name of the Chang Mai Initiative
(Stiglitz, 2002).
Amin (1997) argues that regional economic
integration requires corresponding political integration and the rapprochement of national policies. Since no economy exists without politics
and a state, economic globalisation logically requires the construction of a world political system of which regional entities are necessary transitional steps (Amin, 1997). The ATU thus assumes increased importance in this present era,
which is characterised by a separation between
the globalised space of capitalism's economic
management and the national, and regional,
spaces of its political and social management
(Amin, 1997). While maintaining a degree of
flexibility so as to allow member states to proceed at different paces, the ATU, like the existing regional organisations, must, however, be
invested with sufficient powers of enforcement
to discipline delinquent members and achieve its
objectives.

f) promote the establishment
communications industries;

GOALS OF THE ATU

These objectives, while laudable, are too
broad in scope. Clearly defined goals or benchmarks and specific strategies to achieve them
will make the organisation not only more effective, but also the benefits of membership more
saleable. Achievements, too, can then be readily
measured and it becomes easier to prioritise the
areas that are still in need of improvement. The
ATU needs to coordinate regional procurement
of equipment, institute a continental universal
service fund, and set targets for pay phone distribution as well as other creative strategies to facilitate telephone access, such as tele-centers. In the
absence of concrete, tangible objectives, the
ATU will remain essentially ineffectual and
merely a forum for proposing policies and standards. Its strategic plan, known as the African
Connection, too, is written in general terms.

The ATU has articulated numerous objectives, as
it seeks to:
a) promote the development and adoption of
appropriate African telecommunications policy and regulatory frameworks;
b) promote the financing and funding of telecommunications development;
c) promote programmes for the development of
the African Information Society;
d) prepare special programmes for Africa's
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and rural
telecommunications development;
e) promote human resources development in the
field of info-communications;
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info-

g) co-ordinate the strategies and positions of
Member States in preparation for and at international meetings;
h) promote regional coordination in areas of
value-added services, equipment certification,
technical standards and harmonisation of tariffs;
i) seek to harmonize the actions of Member
States and Associate Members in the telecommunications sector;
j) foster co-operation and partnership between
and among Member States and Associate
Members;
k) promote and encourage the exchange of information, expertise and technology relating
to info-communications for the benefit of all
Member States and Associate Members;
l) undertake studies in the field of infocommunications for the benefit of Member
States and Associate Members; and
m) undertake all such activities not defined
above which may assist in achieving the mission and vision of the Union (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 2001b).
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THE AFRICAN CONNECTION
In August 1998 at the CPL held in Lusaka, Zambia, the 44 member-states of the PATU, in approving resolution 07/6S-CPL/98, adopted the
African Connection as its strategic plan for
1998–2002. The annex to this resolution concerns the ministerial oversight committee, which
is open to all member states, and has a core
group of 11 countries structured in accord with
the AU's five-region division of the continent.
Current members of this committee, which represent the ATU Plenipotentiary and an African
Connection Project Trust and Secretariat, include
Egypt and Libya for North Africa; Cameroon and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo for Central Africa; Sudan and Uganda for East Africa;
Gambia, Ghana, and Niger for West Africa; and
Zimbabwe and the Republic of South Africa for
Southern Africa (African Telecommunications
Union (ATU), 1998). The Republic of South Africa, which has largely spearheaded the initiative,
serves as the chair of the ministerial oversight
committee.
While the African Connection, whose program is being developed under the auspices of
the ATU, does not outline a representative role
for the regional economic organisations and persists in employing the nation-state as the unit of
representation, it does recognise that African policy-makers and businessmen need to go beyond
individual country programmes and create regional telecommunications markets. A Secretariat for the African Connection was established to
create the requisite institutional support for managing cross-country linkages and coordination,
since the African Connection seeks to serve as a
clearinghouse of information and first point of
contact for regional regulatory framework development. The African Connection also seeks to
coordinate regional donor assistance and in so
doing promote economies of scale on subregional and regional levels (The African Connection, 1999). The high level of African leadership and support for the African Connection is
noteworthy as is the positive response from bilateral and multilateral lending institutions. The
language of the document, however, as noted, is
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sufficiently vague in many respects to be effective.
This is exemplified in the first chapter of the
African Connection, entitled Special Programme
for Least Developed Countries and Rural Telecommunications Development, which states that
the “promotion of universal access should be the
driving [author's emphasis] force of change,
while at the same time creating entrepreneurial
opportunities at a local level” (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 1998). The document seemingly contradicts itself, however,
when stating that “[s]trategies that loop some
LDCs and other countries into regional markets
to ensure a critical mass that will interest investors to finance viable projects that guarantee a
commercial return on investment while having
some [author's emphasis] universal service or
access obligations, need to be looked into” (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 1998).
At no point, though, does the African Connection
define universal access or propose how it should
be achieved. Defining universal service policy
objectives is, however, an integral part of the legislative development process, for it empowers
regulators to establish and enforce the mechanisms for implementation of the policy. Without
such definitions and guidelines, it is not possible
to make any assessments of progress on a national or regional level. The African Connection also
fails to provide critical information in regard to
other areas.
Regarding human resources, the inadequate
funding and development of which is endemic to
African institutions and undermines all institutional endeavours, the third chapter of the African Connection contends that creating a network
of human resources at the national, regional and
continental level is essential. To facilitate such
networking and promote an information technology culture, it recommends increased electronic
meetings or communications between different
government departments within the same country
as well as constant periodic electronic communication between governments of different countries (African Telecommunications Union (ATU),
1998). While this could assist in ensuring that
knowledge and experience as well as perhaps

THE AFRICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION | PATRICIA McCORMICK

funding is shared, many government departments
do not have access to the Internet or electronic
mail. The African Connection does not specify
how this initial impediment is to be remedied.
In describing proposed projects in the areas
of tele-medicine, tele-education and teleagriculture, the African Connection does not address the fundamental question of resource allocation, for the use of new communication technologies consumes funds that may be deemed
more necessary elsewhere. For example, while
some health care workers extol the satellite systems and computer networks that have brought
them access to medical information, others denounce the proclaimed advantages of telemedicine because no new knowledge about typical diseases which afflict Africa, such as diarrhea,
tuberculosis, and cholera, can be derived from
the consultation of medical databases (Afemann,
1997). Most diseases in Africa are a result of
malnutrition, inadequate housing, and generally
poor, unsanitary living conditions. Not only can
the Internet not solve these problems, it cannot
provide desperately needed antibiotics, vaccines
and syringes. It is essential to be ever mindful of
the fact that the provision of information, while
useful, even crucial, for many rural poor people
is inadequate, the conditions and resources for
the implementation of such information into
practice must also be provided. The African
Connection does not address this vital point, nor,
as noted, does it set specific benchmarks and detail strategies to achieve them, thus the African
Connection is insufficient as a strategic plan for
the ATU. The lack of sufficient details to implement an effective ICT programme also afflicts
another recent African initiative, the New Partnership for Africa's Development or NEPAD.

is known as the e-Africa Commission, which
serves as the primary advisory body to the Heads
of State and Government Implementation Committee of NEPAD on the development of an effective and comprehensive ICT programme in
Africa. The NEPAD document, “The Strategy
for Achieving Sustainable Development in the
21st Century,” in recognising that Africa's poor
ICT infrastructure constitutes a serious handicap
to economic growth and poverty reduction, outlines five objectives with respect to information
and communications technology:
•

to double teledensity to two lines per 100
people by 2005, with an adequate level of access for households;

•

to lower the cost of and improve reliability of
service;

•

to achieve e-readiness for all countries in Africa;

•

to develop and produce a pool of ICTproficient youth and students, from which
Africa can draw trainee ICT engineers, programmers and software developers;

•

to develop local content software, based especially on Africa's cultural legacy (A New
African Initiative, 2001).

While these goals are commendable, the
NEPAD document, like the Africa Connection,
fails to articulate how these aspirations are to be
realised. The NEPAD document stipulates five
actions to be taken in regard to telecommunications:
•

work with regional agencies such as the ATU
and Africa Connection to design model policy and legislation for telecommunications reform, and protocols and templates for ereadiness assessments;

•

work with the regional agencies to build regulatory capacity;

•

establish a network of training and research
institutions to build high-level man-power;

NEPAD
Formed in 2001, NEPAD proposes four programmes as priorities to be addressed in the
quest for development, including communicable
diseases, specifically HIV/AIDS, malaria and
tuberculosis; debt reduction; market access; and
information and communication technology
(ICT). In the ICT sector the NEPAD Task Team
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•

promote and accelerate existing projects to
connect schools and youth centres;

•

work with development finance institutions
in Africa, multilateral initiatives (G-8 DotForce, UN Task Force) and bilateral donors
to establish financial mechanisms to mitigate
and reduce sector risks legacy (A New African Initiative, 2001).

Not only is the level of generality at which
these actions are stated problematic, there are
other regional and continental agencies in Africa,
such as the ATU, devoted to ICT development
and the harmonization of policies in regard to the
telecommunications sector. Such redundancy of
effort on behalf of NEPAD is thus unproductive.
To redress the widening digital chasm Africa
faces, neither requires duplication nor overlap of
action, but a decisive response on behalf on African leaders to upgrade and expand the telecommunications sector in a coordinated manner at
the regional level.
CONCLUSIONS
The welfare of the people of Africa and the development of an integrated regional economy
requires the empowerment of regional organisations to achieve concerted and higher levels of
coordinated regional institutions and actions. In
the process of promoting intra-regional trade and
supporting industrial development and growth,
the upgrading and development of the telecommunications sector must remain a priority if Africa is to redress its marginalization in an increasingly integrated global economy. Given the
disparate size and level of development of individual African states, there is a clear need for a
comprehensive and coordinated telecommunications policy at a regional and continental level to
create markets which take advantage of economies of scale. Small market size in conjunction
with perceived high country risks creates an environment adverse to investment in African
states. A continental approach, as proposed by
the ATU, has been identified and agreed to in
various fora on the continent, principally because
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isolated country policy and regulatory reform has
proven insufficient to advance the continent
technologically. In harmonising a continental or
‘African’ voice at global conferences, such as the
ITU, the ATU can champion critical issues facing African states, such as in regard to spectrum
allocation.
The ATU, however, must address and resolve
a wide variety of complex issues. In addition to
market size and structure, the current diversity
and inconsistency of regulatory regimes and the
inability and high cost of securing information on
the legal and regulatory frameworks in each
country adversely affects investor confidence.
The ATU is thus obliged to create a continental
regulatory association, comprising the regional
regulatory associations, to ensure uniform, wellbalanced and transparent regulatory structures.
Clearly defined benchmarks must also be agreed
upon and the strategies to achieve them implemented. The ATU needs to build its base of private participants and restructure its institutional
framework to ensure more equitable distribution
of costs and benefits among members. To promote regional telecommunications initiatives as
well as advance the efforts of the AU toward integration, the ATU also needs to replace the individual nation states as members of the ATU
with regional economic organisations. For as
Nkrumah (1963) wrote, “just as our strength lies
in a unified policy and action for progress and
development, so the strength of the imperialists
lies in our disunity.”
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